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The “promise” referred to in the title of Stroud’s new book, Kant and the Promise 
of Rhetoric, concerns the discovery of a whole set of communicative practices 
“oriented toward persuasion, belief formation, and actional change” (7), which 
are an essential part of Kant’s project of moral cultivation but which were never 
acknowledged by Kant himself as containing any genuine “rhetorical” value. 
The purpose of the book is to vindicate the validity of this largely ignored yet 
immensely fruitful field of inquiry.
Stroud’s main contention is that the communicative practices in question are 
designed to “make ourselves and our communities more virtuous and capable of 
instantiating autonomy” (8). This view upends conventional wisdom, according 
to which Kant is “a modern defender of Plato’s attack on rhetoric” (5) and regar-
ded “the art of persuasion through communicative means” with great antipathy 
and distrust. Kant’s biography seems to confirm this picture, as he “turned down 
the post of professor of poetry at the University of Königsberg in 1764, even though 
he was eager for academic advancement and funds” (4). Therefore, reclaiming a 
positive role for rhetoric in the Kantian corpus is an ambitious project. It requi-
res not only overhauling entrenched Platonic habits of thought, but also reinter-
preting the very letter of Kant’s writings, which are often openly hostile toward 
rhetoric.
Such hostility, Stroud argues in the first chapter, owes much to historical 
contingency. It was motivated by Kant’s relation to Christian Garve, a “popular 
philosopher” who taught rhetoric and translated Aristotle’s On Rhetoric and 
Cicero’s On Duties. The Garve-Feder review of the first Critique in the Göttingsche 
Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen (1782) accused Kant of lacking originality and 
being incredibly hard to read. Not only were those charges a spur to write the 
Prolegomena, but they also led Kant to identify rhetoric with the pursuit of honor 
and happiness – the kind of externality the Groundwork disparaged as having no 
intrinsic moral worth. Stroud’s thesis is that Kant conflated the whole of rhetoric 
with Garve’s version of it. This explains why “Kant so often restricts his notion of 
rhetoric to end-based activity, especially connected to maximizing pleasure” (21), 
and turns rhetoric into a mere “tool in a system of moral egoism, or the pursuit of 
one’s idiosyncratic self-interest” (22).
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Much is lost, however, with this conflation. For, although “[i]t is dreadfully 
true that Kant did not write or lecture on the art of speaking or the art of rhetoric, 
[…] this should not prevent us from seeing communicative means of moral impro-
vement in his work” (13). “All that is stopping us from exhuming a useable form of 
rhetoric in Kant,” Stroud believes, “are our own inhibitions” (137). As he candidly 
puts it: “It is not disingenuous to say that one needs a certain amount of faith to 
find a sense of rhetoric in Kant. […] To a very real degree, one must have faith that 
there is a sense of rhetoric in Kant to unearth rhetoric in Kant” (138).
To forestall the charge of empty prophesying, Stroud must be able to cobble 
together, from what Kant did not write or say about rhetoric (there is no specific 
book or record to draw from), a hidden pattern of evidence about how rhetorical 
practices can play an essential role in our moral improvement. The methodolo-
gical challenge, in short, is to make explicit what Kant must have thought but did 
not say about rhetoric. To get the project off the ground, Stroud tackles in chapter 
two what is broadly considered the most damming piece of evidence against rhe-
toric in the Kantian corpus: § 53 of the third Critique. In this section, Kant com-
pares the value of the various fine arts and praises poetry at rhetoric’s expense. 
“The art of poetry,” Kant argues, “claims the highest rank of all” because it sets 
the imagination free, “letting the mind feel its capacity to use nature on behalf of 
and, as it were, as a schema of the supersensible” (KU, AA 05: 326). In contrast,
Rhetoric (Beredsamkeit), insofar as by that is understood the art of persuasion, i.  e., of decei-
ving by means of beautiful illusion (as an ars oratoria), and not merely skill in speaking 
(Wohlredenheit) (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from the art of poetry 
only as much as is necessary to win minds over to the advantage of the speaker before they 
can judge and to rob them of their freedom; thus it cannot be recommended either for the 
courtroom or for the pulpit. (KU, AA 05: 327)
Unlike poetry, which connects a sensible presentation “with a fullness of thought 
to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aes-
thetically to the level of ideas” (KU, AA  05: 326), the art of persuasion obfus-
cates the truth and deceives “by means of beautiful illusion” (KU, AA 05: 327). 
Instead of serving as a symbol of morality, the beautiful is used here to dupe us, 
to cloak “vice and error,” instilling “the deep-seated suspicion of artful trickery” 
(KU, AA 05: 327). “Put simply,” Stroud says, “the evocation of emotions subverts 
the audience’s power of reason to get their cooperation in pursuit of a speaker’s 
end, which renders such a practice manipulative and harmful to the audience’s 
freedom” (40). For, as Kant explains in a footnote, oratory “understands how to 
move people, like machines, to a judgment in important matters which must lose 
all weight for them in calm reflection” (KU, AA 05: 328n.). It is not accidental, 
then, that Kant connects this kind of communication with “dialectic” and “per-
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suasion,” terms which designate the illusory workings of reason when it over-
steps its proper limits, and with the passing of private/subjective grounds as if 
they were public/objective.
Yet, Stroud insists, to confine this passage to a cluster of Platonic dualisms 
(truth vs. illusion, reason vs. emotion, etc.) is to flout important interpretative 
possibilities. As he sees it, Kant leaves room here for a positive sense of rheto-
ric, understood as “skilled speaking (Wohlredenheit) (eloquence and style)” (KU, 
AA 05: 327), as opposed to Beredsamkeit, the manipulative and deceitful use he 
so forcefully condemns. Indeed, certain kinds of human affairs, Kant proceeds 
to explain, contain “distinct concepts” that are debased when “the machinery 
of persuasion” is set in motion, but which can receive new life when “combined 
with a lively presentation in examples, and without offense against the rules of 
euphony in speech or of propriety in expression” (KU, AA 05: 327). This is what 
sometimes happens in the “courtroom and the pulpit”, where “it is a matter of 
civil laws concerning the rights of individual persons, or of the lasting instruc-
tion and conscientious observation of their duty” (KU, AA  05: 327). Here “elo-
quence and style” often work on behalf of morality, using beautiful expression 
as a kind of hypotyposis, “the vivid presentation of a concept that ordinarily 
escapes our ability to understand it empirically” (28). Such sensuous presen-
tations, Stroud argues, transform our affective and cognitive states, allowing 
us to attain, as a result of the rhetorical experience, a genuine respect for the 
moral law.
By challenging the grounds of Kant’s invidious comparison between poetry 
and rhetoric, Stroud manages to draw a wedge into what appeared to be a monoli-
thic sense of rhetoric. This move allows him to topple the traditional Platonic con-
ception of rhetoric as the other of reason and to replace it with a distinction within 
rhetoric itself – a distinction that allows the old enemies to reconcile. According 
to this view, what matters is not the content or tactic used in the process of com-
munication (whether, for example, the speaker resorts to figurative or argumen-
tative language) but the moral orientation an agent brings to bear in the commu-
nicative exchange, for “figurative language can be used in a speaker’s purposive 
scheme to disempower the audience, or it could be used with the intention of 
empowering the audience” (45  f.). The reification of rhetoric as a manipulative 
practice is a form of reductionism that forecloses its non-manipulative potential, 
i.  e. its capacity to edify and promote human freedom.
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I
Rhetoric, it follows from this view, has an epistemic status comparable to prag-
matic anthropology: although cognizing human nature is supposed to remind us 
of our moral teleology (what “the human being […] as a free acting being […] can 
and should make of himself” (Anth, AA  07: 119)), this knowledge can equally 
be used to promote immoral purposes. Just as the vicious and the virtuous alike 
can take advantage, for example, of “what has been found to hinder or stimulate 
memory” (Anth, AA 07: 119), they can also deploy rhetorical means to stifle or 
to trigger the exercise of human freedom. But to forego the “promise” to prevent 
the “curse” is a grave mistake. For both anthropology and rhetoric belong to 
what Robert Louden has aptly called “Kant’s impure ethics,” the “second part” 
of morality that teaches us how the pure, a priori principles of Kant’s practical 
philosophy apply to the historically contingent conditions of human existence.8 
In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant refers to this project as 
“moral anthropology”:
The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of practical 
philosophy as a whole, would be moral anthropology, which, however, would deal only 
with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling 
(die Ausführung) the laws of the metaphysics of morals. It would deal with the development, 
spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular 
instruction), and with similar teachings and precepts based on experience. (MS, AA 06: 217)
In the rest of the book, Stroud explores the contributions of rhetoric, a branch of 
“moral anthropology” neglected until now, to the field of impure ethics. So con-
strued, the “promise” alluded to in the title must be delivered by showing how 
rhetoric contributes to overcoming “the subjective conditions in human nature” 
that hinder our moral development.
In chapter three, Stroud connects those subjective limitations with what he 
calls “the problem of force” in Kant’s practical philosophy. The problem arises 
because it is unclear how to connect external and internal freedom, “acting” and 
“willing,” which are modes of exercising human agency that obey irreducibly dif-
ferent kinds of legislation – external coercion and self-constraint. This distinc-
tion structures the Metaphysics of Morals, which Kant divides into the Doctrine of 
Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In Stroud’s reading, the relation between them is 
hierarchical: “The principle of right is the minimal systemic condition that must 
8 Robert Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000; and Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
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be realized as a precursor to the kingdom of ends” (95), the ideal community of 
virtuous agents. This condition is “minimal,” because even when agents “are not 
well disposed in manner or habit, coercive force might efficaciously be brought 
to bear” (95). By disciplining inclinations, Kant hopes, the state will eventually 
weaken our self-conceited tendencies and foster moral dispositions. Yet, Stroud 
warns us, there is reason to be doubtful of such hope: although the public sword 
can determine my actions, it cannot possibly force me to be moral. This is an act 
of internal freedom I cannot be constrained by others to perform.
Since Kant believes that coercion to have ends is self-contradictory (MS, 
AA 06: 381) and that making another person virtuous is self-defeating because 
it destroys the autonomy it wants to preserve, it follows that the state is in prin-
ciple unable to moralize its citizens. At best, politics can prevent bloodshed and 
secure our property, but it cannot possibly make us good people. At this juncture, 
it would seem that the virtuous must surrender to quietism or despair, waiting 
for others to do a job that external moral intervention would mangle. Yet, Stroud 
argues, precisely here, where politics is to no avail and morality has still to be 
chosen, lies the “promise of rhetoric.” For persuasion offers a middle ground 
between “waiting on others to self-cultivate and manipulatively forcing them to 
‘freely’ choose self-perfection” (102). It avoids both extremes, since rhetoric has 
the power to transform an agent from within, to change her disposition in a non-
coercive and respectful fashion. Stroud’s point is that non-manipulative rhetoric 
offers those who embrace Cato’s ideal of the vir bonus discendi peritus (“the good 
man, powerful in speech” (KU, AA 05: 328n.)) a way to honor their own agency 
and integrity without jeopardizing the agency or integrity of others.9 When force 
leaves human beings stranded, and deception leaves them adrift, only forthright 
persuasion can release them from the grip of natural causality.
II
The “problem of force” plays itself out in various communicative contexts. 
Chapter four is devoted to education. Here, the fundamental tool of non-mani-
pulative rhetoric is the use of hypothetical examples, whose role is to persuade 
agents to adopt a moral self-conception. Unlike real examples, which often insti-
gate jealousy and blind imitation, hypothetical examples stipulate motives and 
maxims in a given situation. It is not a matter of historical accuracy or logical 
9 Kant mistakenly attributes the saying to Cicero, whom he accuses of not “always remaining 
true to this ideal” (KU, AA 05: 328n.).
Authenticated | pablo_muchnik@emerson.edu author's copy
Download Date | 12/15/17 2:16 AM
670   Buchbesprechungen
truth – what matters is the effect the constructed example has on the moral orien-
tation of the student. When successful, “[t]he end desired (a certain disposition) 
is an integral part of the means of communication” (118), for the rhetorical expe-
rience helps the attending agent to actualize the moral mindset described in the 
example. Stroud calls this self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating communicative 
dimension “end-instantiating logic” (118), a feature completely lacking in mani-
pulative rhetoric, where “the speech is a mere goad to get the hearer to (unkno-
wingly) do what the speaker wills” (119). What hypothetical examples reveal is 
“not the physical possibility of a given behavior” but “a certain way of thinking, 
a certain disposition toward why one acts in regard to self and others” (126). In 
this way, examples fulfill an important function in the process of moral schema-
tism: they present something abstract, unknown or not totally understood to the 
auditor by rendering it “‘comprehensible through analogy with something of the 
senses’ (Rel, AA 06: 65n.)” (119).
Chapter five, in my opinion the most original and insightful in Stroud’s book, 
extends the discussion of rhetoric to Kant’s philosophy of religion. The claim is 
that while “religious narratives and symbols provide vivid ways of presenting the 
moral disposition or orientation” (140), rituals offer the chance of “performing the 
moral disposition in communal settings” (141). “Through the vivid presentation 
and performance of such dispositions, Kant’s religious educative rhetoric seeks to 
persuade individuals to move toward the goal of self-improvement, all the while 
avoiding the pitfalls of ego focus, self-love, and competition with others” (141). In 
this model, the visible church “occupies a middle point between the state of right 
(political, external harmony established by coercion) and the ideal state of indivi-
duals governing themselves under the law of virtue (as indicated in the universal 
church and the kingdom of ends), since the visible church is hailed as a vehicle 
to gradually lead humans to progress toward a community that encompasses 
all human agents of their own free volition” (146). Far from being an instrument 
of oppression, religious institutions serve as the locus of free public discourse 
(147). The community is supported by rituals that embody “ways of acting in a 
meaningful fashion,” and hence evoke “the performative force of Kant’s inter-
nally motivating rhetoric to a high degree, as it often relies on performed action 
more than the exact words that are said in its performance” (170).
The final chapter examines the educative effects of “making our own asser-
tions and […] evaluating the claims of others during our communicative interac-
tions” (184). Stroud’s point is that “if citizens speak and listen to one another in 
the right way, they not only instantiate a moralized disposition in the present but 
help bring about its presence in future experience” (207). The rhetorical subject 
functions as producer and receiver of messages, roles Stroud calls “critical rhetor” 
and “rhetorical critic”, respectively. The critical rhetor abides by three maxims: 
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to think for oneself, to think in the position of everyone else, and to think con-
sistently (KU AA 05: 294; cf. Anth, AA 07: 228). These maxims lead her to be simul-
taneously partisan and cosmopolitan – a tension that is resolved by detaching 
one’s personal self-interest from the act of presenting a persuasive argument. 
This detachment happens when we submit our assertions to free and public scru-
tiny, a process which instills an attitude Stroud calls “skeptical fallibilism” (214). 
The rhetorical critic, on the other hand, is aware that “the tribunal of reason lies 
in each of us” (216) and hence develops an open-minded attitude to judge her 
own views and those of others. She treats others as equals, considers their claims 
as potential bearers of truth, and doubts that her own criticisms are certain or 
exhaustive (229). “These maxims all add up to produce what could be called the 
primary guideline of Kantian rhetorical criticism: a critic’s normative self-worth 
is revealed by the moral worth he or she attributes to the subjects of criticism, no 
matter how much he or she disagrees with them” (231).
III
There is much to praise in Stroud’s book, arguably the most ambitious and 
detailed study of Kantian rhetoric to date. My main reservation concerns Stroud’s 
confidence in the accessibility of an agent’s moral orientation, which, in his 
analysis, is the key to determining whether rhetoric is deployed for manipula-
tive or non-manipulative purposes. As I see it, this confidence goes too far, for it 
overlooks the pernicious influence of the “dear self” (GMS, AA 04: 407) and our 
deep-rooted tendencies toward self-deception, which lead us to “throw dust in 
our eyes” (Rel, AA 06: 38) and flatter ourselves regarding the purity of our inten-
tions. This is an important theme in Kantian ethics, which Stroud fails to properly 
address – an omission that makes the account stumble on the very question upon 
which it stands or falls, since there is nothing more dangerous than the rationali-
zations and self-justificatory stories of so-called moralizers.
Leaving this objection aside, there is no doubt that Kant and the Promise of 
Rhetoric is a much-needed and important contribution to the field of Kantian 
studies. It expands the field of “impure ethics” in new directions and will trigger 
renewed interest in this neglected dimension of “moral anthropology.”
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